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Abstract 
The process of accession of the former communist countries into the EU was expected to 
facilitate the emergence of industrial relations (IR) actors with roles similar to those of 
their counterparts in continental Western Europe. Examining the role of the state, 
employers (and their representatives) and trade unions, this paper shows the extent to which 
such comparable functions among IR actors can be observed in Romania. It also explores 
whether or not privatization has led to deeper changes in the role of IR actors at the 
company level. The paper focuses on the functions of the IR actors in four large chemical 
companies (two private and two state-owned enterprises) and investigates the impact of IR 
practices at higher levels of developments at the company level. In order to highlight and 
contrast the developments in the Romanian cases, brief comparisons with other Eastern 
European countries are presented. The findings indicate that while the three main actors 
have started to function similarly to their Western European counterparts, there is 
considerable continuity from pre-1989 era, indicating that institutional changes are path 
dependent. Overall, evidence does not show substantial differences between private 
companies and state-owned firms. This paper contributes towards a deeper 
understanding of the role of endogenous actors during the transformation from a 
centrally planned economy towards a market-based economy. 
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1 Introduction 
The process of accession of the former communist countries into the EU was expected to 
facilitate the emergence of industrial relations (IR) actors with roles similar to those of their 
counterparts in continental Western Europe. Several studies indicate that industrial relations 
(including the actors) in most Eastern European countries resemble the Anglo-Saxon model 
rather than the continental Western European types (Lado, 2002; Crowley, 2004). 
Nevertheless, there is very limited case study research on the actual role played by the 
industrial relations actors. This paper examines the role of the state, employers and their 
representatives, and trade unions in industrial relations practices in Romania. The study has 
two main aims. First, it investigates the extent to which IR actors in Romania have 
comparable functions to those of their counterparts in continental Western Europe. 
Secondly, it explores whether or not privatization led to deeper changes in the role of the IR 
actors at the company level. The paper focuses on the functions of IR actors at the company 
level, and it investigates the impact of IR practices at higher levels of developments at the 
company level. In order to highlight the developments in Romania, brief comparisons 
with other Eastern European countries are presented. 
In contrast to most studies, this paper presents primary data on the perception of workers 
on the roles of the three IR actors beside interviews with key informants. The study is 
based on 107 semi-structured interviews (seven officials from national institutions, nine 
officials from the chemical sector and 91 employees). Apart from interviews, a survey 
was conducted in four case studies.1 125 questionnaires were distributed in each company 
via the personnel department, which led to a very high rate of responses (over 70%). Two 
of the case studies, namely S1 and S2, were privatised companies and two of them, P1 
and P2, were state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 2001. Company S1 was profitable, while 
the other three were making losses for several years. Each company had at least a union 
to which more than 85% of the labour force was affiliated. Thus, this study examines 
qualitative and quantitative data on the actual role played by the main IR actors in 
employment practices in Romania. 
                                                 
1
 18 interviews were carried out in company S1, 16 in companies S2 and P1, and 15 in P2. 
The paper has three main parts. Section 2 examines the state intervention in IR. Section 3 
analyses the development of employers' associations in the chemical sector and their 
functions. Additionally, the influence of top management in IR at company level is 
investigated. Section 4 assesses trade union development, their functions and influence in 
IR after 1989. It was expected that the adoption of a pluralist legislation after 1989 that 
allows trade unions and employers to negotiate voluntary collective agreements, would 
lead to a decrease of the role of the statutory legislation, while the influence of employers 
and trade unions would increase. These changes were expected to be deeper in the two 
private companies as compared to the two SOEs. There is partial support for these 
theoretical propositions, but sometimes the largest variation is between the two privatised 
companies (e.g. on the role of trade unions). The paper concludes with a summary of the 
main findings.  
 
2 The role of the state 
2.1 The setting 
There is large variation in the role and structure of IR actors across countries, but there are 
some basic common characteristics specific to a politico-economic system or region. A 
synopsis of the basic functions of the state in IR in a centrally planned economy and a 
market economy is presented in table 1. Whilst in a centrally planned economy the state 
is the dominant actor which determines nearly all terms and conditions of employment 
(Hethy, 1991: 124-139; Dunlop, 1993: 25), in a market-based economy, it acts generally 
as legislator, as a third party in tripartite institutions and/or in settling industrial conflicts, 
and as employer in the public sector (Dunlop, 1993). The transformation process in 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) was expected to change the autocratic 
state controlled labour relations system into a democratic one, where trade unions and 
employers could freely negotiate the terms and conditions of employment, while the state 
would have similar functions as in market-based economy (Swiatkowski, 1994: 17).  
As Table 1 shows, published studies indicate that after 1989, the state established 
minimum employment standards, and acted as a third party in the tripartite institutions 
and as employer in the public sector in CEECs (Casale, 1997; Pollert, 2000; Clarke et al, 
2003). Nevertheless, the establishment of a new legislative framework has resulted in 
high state intervention in IR, particularly in a context where new social partners had to 
develop and their experience of free collective bargaining was very limited (if any) 
(Hethy, 1991). Additionally, tripartite bodies have been established across CEECs (later 
in Romania than in the other CEECs), but the state has been the dominant player (Draus, 
2001: 20; Thirkell and Vickerstaff, 2002). In contrast to Western Europe, tripartite 
institutions are financed by the state and the functioning of tripartism depends on the 
goodwill and on the political interests of the government in power (Thirkell and 
Vickerstaff, 2002). The role of the state as employer dramatically diminished with the 
privatization of the SOEs, but the state has had an important role in the privatization 
process. Moreover, as Romania started with a very centralised labour relations system 
and adopted a gradualist approach to the transformation process, state intervention in IR 
appears to be higher than in the other CEECs. Therefore, published studies suggest that 
the state has similar roles in IR in CEECs as in Western Europe, but its intervention is 
more extensive. Nonetheless, the perceptions of employees with regard to the role of the 
state in the transformation of IR at company level have rarely been investigated. 
Table 1.  The role of the state in IR 
 
Centrally planned 
economy 
Market economy 
(continental Western 
Europe) 
CEECs 
after 1989 
Legislator 
Virtually all terms 
and conditions of 
employment  
• Minimum 
standards 
• Enforcement of 
the legislation 
• Established 
pluralist legislation 
• Minimum 
standards 
• Weak capacity of 
enforcement of 
the legislation 
Third party Authoritarian 
control 
Roughly equal party 
in tripartite institutions 
(if they exist)  
• Third party, but 
still dominant 
player 
Employer Predominant owner Public sector smaller than the private sector 
• Major owner, but 
public sector 
smaller than the 
private sector  
• Important role in 
privatization 
 
2.2 Analysis and discussion of the empirical findings 
Based on interviews and surveys in the four case studies, this study examines changes 
and continuity in the main roles of the state and its degree of influence in IR at company 
level in Romania after 1989. It was expected that: 
• State influence over terms and conditions of employment would decrease with 
progressive adoption of pluralist legislation. 
• The state would have higher influence over terms and conditions of employment in 
SOEs as compared to private enterprises. 
The research attempts to verify these two theoretical propositions.  
 
Strong influence of the state on the transformation of IR at company level 
Evidence suggests that the state plays a major role in IR as legislator. Apart from 
establishing the basic rules for interaction between the representatives of the employer 
and employees, respondents indicated that the legislation regarding environmental 
protection and health and safety has improved and it has been monitored more strictly. 
Interviewees revealed that these changes have been part of the harmonization process of 
Romanian legislation with EU requirements. Nevertheless, respondents reported that they 
were not content with this legislation (passed in 2001), because it has allowed employers 
to reduce wages.2 Also, interviewees indicated that there has not been a substantial 
improvement of the work environment, particularly in the company S2. Thus, findings 
suggest that the EU requirements have influenced the labour laws, but the legislation is 
not always implemented, substantiating previous studies in other CEECs (Pollert, 2000). 
As in Western Europe, the Romanian state establishes the minimum employment 
standards, such as the national minimum wage, working hours, pensions, maternity leave, 
and health and safety regulations. Interviewees revealed that at the beginning of the 
1990s, the state intervened in favour of labour, by decreasing the working hours from 48 
to 40 per week, increasing maternity leave from one to two years and ensuring higher 
                                                 
2
 Before 2001, employees who worked in a toxic environment and high-risk conditions were legally 
entitled to a bonus of up to 25% of their wages and to retire earlier. 
wages, in order to gain legitimacy and to get political support. Subsequently, the levels of 
pensions, minimum wage and other legal allowances have drastically decreased due to 
inflation. Furthermore, respondents indicated that the government usually increases the 
level of pensions prior to elections, to achieve the political support of the older people. 
Additionally, the legislation entitles employees from particular sectors (e.g. mining) to 
receive higher severance pay than others (e.g. the chemical sector), because the miners 
put pressure on the government via strikes which have threatened the government. 
Therefore, evidence suggests that certain labour laws are based on short-term pragmatic 
interests of the government. 
The findings indicate that the state had an important influence on the transformation of IR 
after 1989. Survey data – in table 2 - show that, on average, around half of the 
respondents consider that the state had a high (or very high) influence over changes that 
have occurred in their company after 1989. From the evidence it appears that the state  
has had lower effect on IR in the private enterprises than in the SOEs (table 2). Thus, 
evidence suggests that the state has strongly influenced changes that have occurred in IR 
in large companies, particularly in the SOEs. 
 
Table 2. The state influence on changes in IR since 1989 (percentage of respondents) 
Company Very high High Little Very little Not at all  
S1 27.4 24.5 22.6 11.3 14.2 
S2 19.1 17.0 16.0 14.9 33.0 
P1 22.0 32.9 32.9 7.3 4.9 
P2 36.9 20.4 16.5 10.7 15.2 
Unweighted 
average 26.8 23.4 21.6 11.2  17.1 
Independent  
t-test 
Difference between the private 
companies and - SOEs t =2.867;    p<0.005 
 
Considering that the state established the terms and conditions of employment before 
1989, it was expected that its influence on IR would decrease. Surprisingly, survey data 
indicates that influence of statutory legislation on terms and conditions of employment 
increased in the opinion of 43% respondents on average in the four companies 
investigated, while only 12% considered that it decreased (table 3). Apart from 
contradicting the theoretical proposition, findings show that even the state has more 
freedom to intervene in IR than before 1989.  
 
Table 3. Changes in statutory legislation influence on terms and conditions of 
employment after 1989 (percentage of respondents) 
Company Increased The same Decreased I do not know 
I did not 
work before 
1989 
S1 60.0 20.0 3.3 7.5 9.2 
S2 31.0 21.2 15.0 15.9 16.8 
P1 34.8 22.5 14.6 11.2 16.9 
P2 45.6 17.5 15.8 13.2 7.9 
Unweighted 
average 43.6 20.2 11.9 11.9 12.4 
Independent  
t-test 
Difference between the private 
companies and - SOEs t =0.528;    p>0.05 
 
Nevertheless, survey data shows that less than one third of respondents consider that the 
state still has a high influence on pay, while more than two thirds perceive that the state 
has a strong influence on working hours and working conditions (figure 1). Findings 
indicate a decrease of state intervention on pay after 1989, but its influence on working 
hours and working conditions remained high. Overall, respondents consider that the state 
role in IR increased rather than decreased after 1989, contradicting the expectation that 
the state influence on IR would decrease with progressive adoption of pluralist 
legislation.  
 
Figure 1 - Percentage of respondents considering that statutory legislation has a high 
influence on selected terms and conditions of employment  
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Moreover, the largest number of respondents who consider that the state influence has 
increased was in the private company S1. It appears that two thirds of respondents in the 
company S1 consider that state influence increased because the state had a huge impact 
on job security on two occasions. Firstly, in 1997, the company was almost closed down 
by the government as it was making huge losses. Secondly, in 2000, the state agencies 
managed the privatization process which resulted in a privatization contract that obliged 
the new owner to preserve the existing number of jobs for the next five years. Taking into 
account that between 23% and 55% of employees lost their jobs after 1989 in the four 
companies investigated, it is natural that employees are more concerned with job security 
than with the level of pay or other terms and conditions of employment. 
Company S1 is not an isolated case, as in 1997 ten refineries had huge debts to the 
Bancorex (a public bank) and none of them paid its debt back until 2000 (when Bancorex 
went bankrupt), despite the fact that seven refineries were privatised (The Romanian Oil 
Sector –Looking back in Anger, 2001). Consequently, the perception of an increase in 
state influence on IR is likely to be due to its new roles in the transition context, 
particularly its impact on job security by not enforcing financial discipline. Considering 
the four terms and conditions of employment presented in figure 1, the overall result of 
the independent sample t-test shows that there is a significant difference between the 
private companies and SOEs. The largest difference is on pay and working hours, while 
for working conditions and social benefits there are no significant differences. The lowest 
number of respondents who consider that the state has a high influence is in the company 
S2, which was privatised six years earlier than S1, which may indicate that state 
intervention decreases with the increase of duration since privatization. Apart from job 
security, empirical data substantiates the theoretical proposition that the state has lower 
influence over terms and conditions of employment in privatised companies as compared 
to SOEs. 
The main issue regarding state intervention, noticed in all companies investigated, was an 
inadequate implementation of labour legislation. According to a human resource 
manager, the frequent changes in the legislation, sometimes not coherent with the 
existing legislation, makes it very difficult to implement it and creates an appropriate 
environment for corruption. Unwieldy legislation and weak enforcement mechanisms 
seem to be a feature of the transition period in Eastern Europe. In the synthesis regarding 
changes in employment relations in CEECs, Pollert (2000: 1998) noticed that there are 
difficulties in understanding and applying the law, and legislation is a poor regulator. 
Thus, the specific context of transition seems to be responsible for an inadequate 
enforcement mechanism of labour legislation. 
 
2.3 Significance of the empirical findings 
Empirical data revealed that the state has a strong influence in IR as legislator and as 
employer, substantiating other studies in CEECs (Martin, 1997; Vickerstaff and Thirkell, 
1997; Pollert, 2000). Referring to the major trends in IR in CEECs in the late 1990s, 
Martin (1997: 181) argues that the “role of the state extended far beyond establishing the 
rules of the game”. Nevertheless, the investigation of the four Romanian companies has 
brought original data about employees’ perception of the state role in IR at company 
level. Despite a decrease of state influence on pay after 1989, this research revealed that 
expansion of state jurisdiction in areas that affect job security makes far more employees 
feel that the state influence on IR increased compared to the number of those that  
consider it to have decreased. The research revealed a strong link between job security 
and state intervention in IR in the Romanian context where transition is not very 
advanced, but the situation may be different in other CEECs.  
Evidence suggests that the role of the state in IR is more extensive in countries such as 
Romania, where the overall transition towards a market-based economy is less advanced. 
The labour legislation is still in flux3, government decisions are taken under the pressure 
of specific groups (e.g. miners’ strikes or trade union intervention in company S1) or 
politically contingent on electoral consideration (e.g. increase of pensions before 
elections) and there is a weak capacity of enforcement of the legislation. Nevertheless, 
the unstable and unpredictable environment, with immature and inexperienced social 
actors resulted in a higher state intervention in IR throughout CEECs as compared to 
Western Europe.  
                                                 
3
 New Labour Code was introduced in March 2003 and the government is in the process of changing it in 
2005. 
 3 Employers and their representatives  
3.1 The setting 
Table 4 presents a synthesis of the basic functions of employers' associations in a 
centrally planned economy and a market economy. In a centrally planned economy there 
are no employers' associations per se (Swiatkowski, 1994: 31). During the communist 
period, the SOEs were associated in Chambers of Commerce and Industry for 
commercial purposes, but they did not deal with employment issues and they were 
subordinated to the party-state (Hethy, 1991). The emergence and development of 
employers' associations in Western Europe was generally determined by the collective 
need of employers to bargain with strong organised labour. Apart from collective 
bargaining and lobbying the government, they may have commercial functions, give legal 
advice to their members and deal with public relations. Thus, employers' associations are 
a new institution developed after 1989 in CEECs, in a very different political and 
historical context than in Western Europe. 
 
Table 4.  Basic features of employers' associations 
 
Centrally planned 
economy 
(Chambers of 
commerce) 
Market economy 
(Continental 
Western Europe) 
CEECs 
after 1989 
Structure Centralized (national) 
Predominantly 
sectoral or branch 
Weak sectoral and 
fragmented 
Collective 
bargaining No  
Main function 
(Dominant multi-
employer bargaining) 
Reduced role 
(Dominant single 
employer bargaining) 
Lobby the 
state 
No (subordinated to 
the state) 
Generally, secondary 
function Principal function R
o
le
 
Others Commercial Trade, legal advice, public relations 
Commercial and 
legal advice 
Although there are major differences among employers' associations, empirical findings 
indicate a weak institutional development across CEECs (table 4). In the synthesis of IR 
development of the EU candidate countries, Drauss (2001: 5) argues that employers' 
associations in CEECs are artificial players created with substantial assistance from the 
state to put in place tripartite structures in order to meet immediate political interests. 
Other studies also revealed that employers' associations are primarily interest groups 
(representing initially state enterprises) dealing with economic policy and providing 
services for individual members (e.g. legal assistance), but they are frequently not 
authorized by their members to conclude collective agreements on their behalf (Lecher 
and Optenhogel, 1995; Toth, 1997: 340 - in Hungary; Mihes and Casale, 1999 - in 
Romania). Moreover, there is often rivalry between employers' organizations which led 
to a fragmented structure. The weak development of employers' associations is generally 
explained in terms of heterogeneity of the new (private) employers, lack of experience as 
well as individual employers’ strength at company level (Toth, 1997; Draus, 2001). 
Therefore, empirical studies throughout CEECs revealed that employers' organizations 
are generally not well developed. 
 
3.2 Analysis and discussion of the empirical findings 
Apart from the role of employers' associations in the tripartite bodies, there has been 
limited empirical investigation of the development and the operation of employers' 
associations in CEECs. In this context, the study provides evidence about the 
development of employers' associations in the chemical sector and their role and 
influence in IR in the four companies investigated in Romania. In addition, the role of the 
individual employers and/or top managers in IR at company level is examined. It was 
expected that: 
• The influence of employers and/or their representatives over terms and conditions of 
employment would increase with the progressive adoption of pluralist legislation. 
• Employers and/or their representatives would have lower influence over terms and 
conditions of employment in SOEs as compared to private enterprises. 
 
Weak and fragmented employers' organizations in the chemical sector 
There are five employers' organizations in the chemical sector. Established in 1990, the 
Fepachim is the largest and the most important employers' association in the chemical 
industry. It is the only one which fulfils the representativeness criteria to negotiate 
collective agreements for the entire sector and to be involved in national tripartite bodies. 
Nevertheless, there is another employers' association in the chemical sector, the Aperom 
Federation, which negotiates collective agreements for a group of enterprises from the 
petrochemical and rubber branches. Additionally, there are three employers’ 
organizations for specific branches, namely for plastic materials, rubber and medicine 
production, but generally their members do not authorise them to represent their interests 
in relation to labour. Therefore, evidence in the chemical sector confirms that in Romania 
there is a fragmented structure of employers' organizations. 
It appears that an important reason for the emergence of employers' associations was to 
promote trade and to represent their specific interests vis-à-vis the government as regards 
to fiscal facilities and labour legislation. The Fepachim was established by a group of top 
managers of the SOEs. They have contacted top managers from chemical enterprises 
asking them to join the federation. As initially top managers had neither legitimacy 
(being part of the former nomenclature) nor experience in a competitive economy, they 
were willing to join any form of employers' associations which could support them. An 
incentive to become an employers' association (not trade association) was the fact that 
they have the right to participate in a number of tripartite committees, only if they have 
the status of a representative employers' association at sectoral level. For instance, the 
Fepachim participates in the Consultative Commissions for Social Dialog, where 
tripartite consultation on draft laws concerning the chemical industry takes place. An 
employer' association official indicated that even if they do not influence the decisions 
taken, the participation in the tripartite bodies gives them the opportunity to be informed 
about government plans. In contrast to Western Europe, employers' associations were 
created by the top managers of the SOEs to consolidate their position in the company, to 
promote trade among the members and to represent employers’ interests vis-à-vis the 
state and trade unions. 
Data about employers' associations in the chemical sector were not available. However, 
being representative at sectoral level means that the Fepachim includes employers 
covering at least 10% of the labour force in the chemical industry. With regard to 
ownership, a trade union official indicated that approximately half of the Fepachim 
members are private employers, respectively half are SOEs representatives, while 
generally, employers’ associations are dominated by the state representatives. Therefore, 
private employers in the chemical industry appear to be better organised than in other 
sectors, probably because the chemical sector was shrinking after 1989 more than other 
industries and employers (or top managers) had the common interest to survive.  
However, many private employers opted out from the employers’ associations after 
privatization. This is illustrated by the two private companies investigated (S1 and S2) 
which are not affiliated to any employers' organization. Company S1 was affiliated to the 
Fepachim before privatization, but the new employer opted out. Nevertheless, the terms 
and conditions of employment agreed at company level are much better than those 
established in the collective agreement at sectoral level. The case of company S1 suggests 
that private employers do not necessary leave the employers' association to apply less 
favourable provisions for employees.  
Other respondents indicated that private employers opted out from Fepachim because 
they were not content with their services, but also for economic reasons. An official of 
the Employers’ Association of the Plastic Material Producers revealed that they left the 
Fepachim, on the one hand, because the representatives employers' association and trade 
union federation were “too close friends”, having their headquarters in the same building. 
On the other hand, he revealed that some employers (around 10%) could not afford to pay 
the minimum wage established for the chemical sector, due to a very intense (unfair) 
competition from the informal sector. He indicated that producing plastic materials does 
not require a large investment and highly skilled labour as in other sub-sectors (e.g. the 
petrochemical branch). As a result, there are many micro companies (having less than 
nine employees) in the market, which employ labour without an employment contract. 
The unfair competition from the informal sector and the lack of trust in the employers' 
association, appear to be important reasons why private employers opted out from the 
employers' association Fepachim.  
Summing up, despite the fact that private employers in the chemical sector appear to be 
better organised than in other industries, many private employers have chosen to opt out 
from employers' associations. Weak organization of the private employers determined by 
the heterogeneity of the newly emerging private sector seems to be a general issue in 
CEECs, linked to the transition process. For instance, Leche and Optenhogel (1995: 403) 
indicated that in Eastern Europe the new employers act usually in a grey zone and they 
are not interested in collective bargaining. Similarly, Toth (1997: 341) noticed that the 
heterogeneous interests of the employers, particularly their battle for market share, make 
the emergence of the common interests unlikely. Therefore, similar to other CEECs, the 
Romanian private employers are not well organised. 
 
Limited influence in collective bargaining 
According to a representative of the Fepachim, the main activities of the organization are 
as follows: 
• to participate in the negotiation of the collective agreement at national level (across 
sectors) as part of the largest employers’ confederation  
• to negotiate the collective agreement in the chemical and petrochemical sector 
• to make a proposal for investment in infrastructure in the chemical sector (a project 
funded by the EU) 
• to lobby the government concerning the exemption of the import tariffs for certain 
raw materials which are not domestically produced 
• to organise the participation of their members in a pilot programme for management 
vocational training, co-ordinated by a tripartite body.  
In addition, the Fepachim has been consulted by the government in regard to the national 
and sectoral medium term strategies and the harmonization of the legislation concerning 
the chemical sector with the EU requirements. The case of the Fepachim confirms other 
evidence suggesting that employers' associations deal with a wide range of issues at 
national and sectoral level (Toth, 1997: 341), probably more extensive than in many 
Western European countries, because of the transition context in which many issues have 
to be settled. 
Two employers' associations in the chemical sector have negotiated collective 
agreements after 1989. The Fepachim concluded three sectoral collective agreements, 
each of them for a period of five years (1990-1996, 1996-2001 and 2001-2005), while 
supplementary agreements dealing particularly with pay were annually negotiated. The 
other employers' association, the Aperom Federation, negotiated two collective 
agreements for a group of enterprises (including company S1) in 1993 and 2001, while 
wages have been negotiated annually. The framework agreements negotiated appear to 
be in a similar fashion as the five-year and annual plans that operated before 1989, 
suggesting that inherited legacies affected the new labour institutions. 
Evidence revealed that in Romania (as in other CEECs) the role and effectiveness of the 
employers' associations in collective bargaining is rather modest (Deppe and Tatur, 1997: 
266; Toth, 1997: 340). In 2001, the main difference between the sectoral collective 
agreement concluded for the chemical industry and the national collective agreement 
(which covers all industrial sectors) was an increase with 35% as compared to the 
national minimum wage. Nevertheless, a union official indicated that there are companies 
which cannot afford to pay this wage level. In these companies, the local actors 
’negotiate’ at company level a lower minimum wage than at the sectoral level, although 
this is illegal. The union representative said that they can sue employers who pay lower 
wages than those established in the sectoral agreement, but they prefer to accept lower 
wages in order to save the jobs of their members, which would be lost if companies go 
out of business. Among the four case studies, the collective agreement concluded in the 
company S2 included provisions below those in the sectoral agreement, according to the 
respondents. The fact that the sectoral agreement is not implemented in companies that 
have a poor financial situation indicates a weak effectiveness of collective bargaining. 
A major internal problem of the Romanian employers' associations is the lack of 
resources. The staff of the Fepachim consists of four officials among whom only one (the 
vice-president) is working full-time for the organization, while the others have another 
main job, working for the Fepachim only when it is really required (e.g. during the 
collective bargaining process). Moreover, the vice-president of the Fepachim has no 
financial resources to employ an assistant, hence he does all the work from making the 
proposal for collective bargaining to making copies of the papers and distributing them to 
each member. Totally surprising, the headquarters of the Fepachim, which consists of 
three rooms in a chemical (public owned) company looked poorer than the headquarters 
of the representative trade union federation which was in the same building (on the same 
floor), but unions had more facilities and more staff. Such a lack of resources for the 
employers' association indicates clearly that employers do not give much importance to 
the activities of the Fepachim, probably because it does not really affect their business. It 
also raises doubts about their degree of independence from the state and trade unions. 
Another issue revealed during interviews was the reluctance of the members of the 
employers’ associations to make compromises in order to achieve a common bargaining 
position. According to a Fepachim official, “it is more difficult to achieve an agreement 
among the employers' association members, than it is to negotiate with the trade unions”. 
This is not an atypical case. A state official working with the Economic and the Social 
Council indicated that generally, employers' associations are not able or not willing to 
have a common view either vis-à-vis trade unions or towards the state. Thus, an 
important obstacle in the development of the employers' associations appears to be the 
unwillingness of their members to delegate them power to negotiate in their behalf.  
Table 5.  Changes in top managers influence on terms and conditions of employment 
after 1989 (percentage of respondents) 
Company Increased The same Decreased I do not know 
I did not 
work before 
1989 
S1 77.2 7.3 2.4 3.3 9.8 
S2 56.1 10.5 5.3 10.5 17.5 
P1 39.3 19.1 6.7 18.0 16.9 
P2 45.6 17.5 22.8 6.1 7.9 
Unweighted 
average 54.6 13.6 9.3 9.5 13.0 
Independent  
t-test 
Difference between the private 
companies and - SOEs t =2.465;    p<0.05 
      
It appears that employers delegate little power to employers' associations because they 
have enough authority at company level to determine the terms and conditions of 
employment as they desire. Table 5 indicates that the influence of the top managers 
increased in the opinion of 55% of the respondents, on average in the four companies 
examined, while only 14% considered that it decreased.  
Additionally, more than 75% of the respondents indicated that top managers have a 
strong influence over specific terms and conditions of employment, such as pay and 
working conditions, as figure 2 shows. Findings confirm the expectation that the 
influence of top managers over terms and conditions of employment would increase with 
the progressive adoption of a pluralist legislation. The evidence also substantiates the 
theoretical proposition that the influence of the employers’ representatives is higher in 
private companies as compared to the SOEs. This research confirms other findings in 
CEECs which indicated that poor development of the employers' associations is 
associated with strong employers’ influence at company level, particularly in the private 
sector (Martin, 1999; Pollert, 2000: 202). 
 
Figure 2 -  Percentage of respondents considering that top managers have a high 
influence on selected terms and conditions of employment 
 
  
 
3.3 Significance of the empirical findings 
Findings from the chemical sector emphasise general problems faced by the employers' 
associations in Romania and in other CEECs. Similar to the Romanian chemical sector, 
an unwillingness and inability of employers to organise themselves as a party in 
collective bargaining was found in Poland and Hungary by Deppe and Tatur (1997: 266). 
The heterogeneity of the employers, particularly in the newly emerged private sector 
which often operated somewhere between the formal and informal sector, make it very 
difficult for the employers to agree on a common bargaining position (Toth, 1997: 341). 
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It appears that private employers are reluctant to delegate authority to the employers' 
associations because of the ambiguity of the transition context, in which the legislation is 
selectively implemented, allowing them sufficient freedom to decide the terms and 
conditions of employment at company level.  
Findings suggest that a weak development of the employers’ association is associated 
with a strong influence of the individual employers at company level in CEECs. As in a 
market economy system, employers have a strong influence on IR, but in Romania there 
appears to be a rather ‘wild capitalism’, where often agreements established are not 
implemented. Furthermore, weak impact of the sectoral agreements, poor development of 
the employers' associations and the fact that the labour law is sometimes ignored appear 
to be general issues across CEECs (Toth, 1997; Kohl et al, 2000; Pollert, 2000). 
Employers’ influence on IR in Romania seems to be more close to those at the beginning 
of the industrialization era in Western Europe, despite the fact that the institution of 
employers’ associations exists and it is supposed to have similar functions as in 
contemporary Western Europe.  
 
4 Trade unions 
4.1 The setting 
A synopsis of the main functions of the trade unions in a planned economy and a market 
economy are presented in table 6. During the communist period, trade union leaders were 
usually part of the party apparatus and their main role was to ensure that members obeyed 
the party’s rule and fulfilled the plan. Additionally, unions administrated in-company 
social benefits as well as dealt with individual issues arising at the workplace, since they 
were company based. Unions generally did not truly negotiate collective agreements, as 
they were neither independent nor had the right to strike (Hethy, 1991). In contrast, the 
main function of the union in a market-based economy is usually collective bargaining 
backed up by the right to strike. Additionally, unions may be involved in tripartite bodies 
and they generally provide certain services for individual members, such as legal advice. 
The membership base varies greatly, but usually the basic unit of the union hierarchy is 
the branch. Therefore, role and the structure of trade unions are very different in a 
centrally planned economy as compared to those in a competitive market economy.  
 
Table 6.  Basic features of trade unions 
 
Centrally planned 
economy 
 
Market economy 
(Continental 
Western Europe) 
CEECs 
after 1989 
Membership 
base 
Company (single 
union) Branch (generally)  
Company (multi-
unions) 
Collective 
bargaining 
No generally 
(no right to strike) 
Main function 
(right to strike) 
Weakly established   
(right to strike) 
Relations 
with the 
state 
‘Transmission belt’ 
(subordinated to 
the party-state) 
Tripartite institutions 
Tripartite institutions 
and significant 
political role R
o
le
 
Others Distribute social benefits  
Health and safety, 
training, public 
relations 
New labour 
legislation, economic 
restructuring 
Published studies indicate that after 1989, unions in the CEECs have changed to a certain 
extent their role and structure, but there is also continuity (Pollert, 2000; Draus, 2001). 
Despite differences across CEECs, there are a number of common trends in the 
development of trade unions after 1989 (table 6). In all countries, trade unions emerged, 
either by restructuring former communist unions, or they have been set up as new (rival) 
organizations to the former ones (Pollert, 2000: 194). Generally, the old reformed unions 
emerged as the dominant players, as they retained most of the assets of their 
predecessors, including a large number of members (Draus, 2001: 11). Initially, there was 
a strong rivalry between the two types of unions, which have resulted in a pluralist union 
structure at all levels, particularly in Hungary and Romania (Draus, 2001: 11). As unions 
have maintained their company-based structure, several unions may be present in an 
enterprise (Aro and Repo, 1997). Furthermore, company unions are not always 
independent from the management, resulting in a weak effectiveness of company 
collective bargaining (Pollert, 2000). Therefore, the effectiveness of the company unions 
appears to be limited.  
Several studies indicate that trade unions have had a weak influence in the tripartite 
bodies and in the transformation policy throughout CEECs, although they continue to 
have a strong political role (Crowley and Ost, 2001; Draus, 2001: 16). The economic 
restructuring, rising unemployment and the general climate favouring market mechanism 
resulted in a sharp decline in trade union membership during the 1990s. In most 
countries, the trade union membership is currently between 20% and 40% (Schulten, 
2005). Their influence in the tripartite bodies appears to depend on the degree of macro-
economic transformation, as governments still need union support for reforms in 
countries where the restructuring process is less advanced (Thirkell and Vickerstaff, 
2002). Nevertheless, unions had an important role in establishing the new labour 
legislation throughout CEECs (Draus, 2001). Therefore, unions have attempted to defend 
workers’ interests, but the unfavourable macro-economic and political contexts along 
with inherited legacies resulted generally in weak effectiveness.   
 
4.2 Analysis and discussion of the empirical findings 
Considering that under the communist regime, the Romanian trade unions were totally 
subordinated to the Communist Party, it was expected that their influence over terms and 
conditions of employment would increase due to the adoption of the pluralist legislation. 
Trade union influence was expected to be higher in the SOEs than in the private 
companies. The research aims at verifying these expectations, subsequent to the 
examination of the development of trade unions at the sectoral and company levels. 
 
Fragmented and decentralised union structures  
According to a state representative, immediately after 1989, two types of union 
(con)federations developed.  
• The first type had a top-down structure aiming to create (con)federations based on the 
existing structure of the former communist union. Officials of the (con)federation 
strove to organise workers within companies on the structure which was in place 
before 1989 and to attract as many as possible company trade unions in order to keep 
the assets of the former communist union. The two largest union federations 
operating in the chemical sector, namely the Free Trade Union Federation from the 
Chemical and Petrochemical Industry (hereafter FSLCP) and The Free and 
Independent Trade Union Federation Petrom (hereafter the FSLI Petrom) are based 
on the former communist unions and they have a top-down structure.  
• The second type of (con)federations was based on a bottom-up structure, in which 
firstly company unions were established locally, then they joined in a federation and 
subsequently two or more federations associated to create a confederation. The Lazar 
Edeleanu Federation is a new organization with a bottom-up structure.  
However, the Lazar Edeleanu Federation is part of the CNSRL-Fratia (the successor of 
the communist union), while the other two federations are affiliated to the CNS Carter 
Alfa confederation, which is considered a new organization. Evidence indicates that there 
is no clear separation between old and new organizations at different levels.  
Trade union pluralism is sometimes associated with fragmentation and competition 
among unions (Pollert, 2000). At the sectoral level, respondents indicated that there is 
neither competition nor many links between the three federations, probably because they 
cover different branches of the chemical sector. However, case studies revealed that at 
the company level, there is sometimes fragmentation and competition along two lines. 
The most common division is between white–collar and blue-collar employees. In all 
four companies examined, white-collar employees indicated that unions do not represent 
their interests and as before 1989, many blue-collar workers have better wages than the 
white-collar employees. White-collar employees were organised in a separate union only 
in the company P1, while in company P2 a union was created in 1990, but it was 
dissolved due to lack of leaders committed to keep it operating. Despite clearly expressed 
divergences between blue-collar and white-collar employees, it is very difficult for the 
white-collar employees to organise in a separate union, as their number is generally far 
lower than those of the blue-collar employees in the manufacturing companies.  
The second form of fragmentation is specific to the transition period, being based on the 
rivalry between the old reformed unions and new ones. This type of division was found 
only in company S2, where the two unions operating in the company are competing for 
members and there is a private rivalry between the leaders of the two unions, according to 
some respondents. An interviewee suggested that the management supports the rivalry 
between the unions, because they prefer to have divided and weak unions. In Romania, 
an excessive fragmentation at company level is discouraged by the legislation that gives 
the right to negotiate collective bargaining only for representative unions, which at 
company level means that they have to cover more than one third of the labour force. 
Therefore, union pluralism is occasionally associated with fragmented and competing 
unions like in other CEECs, but at company level it appears to be less frequent than in 
Hungary and Poland (Aro and Repo, 1997: 161) due to differences in the legislation.  
Trade union hierarchies have been decentralised after 1989. Trade union federations are 
an umbrella of the workplace unions, which have their own legal identity and they pursue 
autonomous policies on behalf of their members. As before 1989, the company unions 
have their own assets and they collect the membership fees, giving a small fraction of the 
membership dues to the federations and confederation to which they are affiliated. A 
decentralised structure of the federations, with the company unions as the basic unit of 
the associations is common in CEECs (Pollert, 2000). The legacy of the communist 
period and employers’ preference for decentralised bargaining appear to be main factors 
which influenced the structure of the unions in Eastern Europe (Pollert, 2000: 195). In 
contrast to Western Europe, trade union federations in CEECs consist of company unions 
similar to the pre-1989 era.  
 
Decline of trade union membership 
Union membership severely declined during the 1990s, but trade union density in the 
chemical sector is still around 60%, above the national average. According to the 
representative of the FSLCP, trade union membership in 1990 was close to 100% as 
virtually all members of the old union has been transferred to the newly established 
unions, but individuals had the freedom to withdraw from the unions and some did so. 
Union officials indicated that there are no trade unions in the new private companies 
which are generally small and medium sized enterprises. A decline of trade union 
membership, particularly due to weak or non-existent trade union representation in the 
newly emerging private sector, was generally found in CEECs (Stanojevic and Gradev, 
2003). However, survey data indicates that in the large companies investigated there was 
an increase in the union density after 1989. As presented in table 7, findings show that in 
three out of four companies examined the percentages of non-union members in 2001 are 
lower than in 1989. Company S2 seems to be an extreme case with 20% of the 
respondents non-union members before 1989, probably due to the fact that many 
employees had criminal records and they were not permitted to join the union. Therefore, 
empirical findings contradict the general trend found in the CEECs. 
Table 7. Trade union membership before 1989 and in 2001  
(percentage of respondents) 
 
Yes No Company 
Pre-1989 In 2001 Pre-1989 In 2001 
I did not work 
before 1989 
S1 84.6 98.4 3.3 0.8    9.8 
S2 56.7 86.7 20.0 6.7 16.7 
P1 76.4 96.6 5.6 0.0 16.9 
P2 88.9 86.3 3.4        10.3   6.8 
Unweighted 
average 76.7 92.0 8.1 4.5 12.6 
Independent  
t-test  
Difference between the private 
companies and – SOEs in 2001 t =1.286;    p>0.05 
 
The increase in union density appears to be linked, on one hand, with the massive 
reductions of the personnel during 1990s, and on the other hand, with the poor living 
standard of the employees. In the context of the high job insecurity, respondents revealed 
that they were more likely to be made redundant if they were not trade union members. In 
addition, respondents indicated that they need the financial help provided by unions, from 
credit to buy household items to financial help for health problems. Case studies’ findings 
indicate that the uncertain context of transition may induce an increase in the union 
density. Nevertheless, this is likely to happen only in very large companies, where unions 
have substantial resources to help their members. Overall, there was a decline of trade 
union membership in the chemical sector, due to the reduction of personnel and the lack 
of unions in the newly private sector. 
 
Change and continuity in the role and influence of trade unions 
Interviews confirmed that before 1989, unions in the chemical sector were totally 
subordinated to the Communist Party. Their main role was to implement the ‘directives’ 
given by the Party, but they also distributed houses and were responsible for sport and 
cultural activities. Respondents revealed that most employees were afraid to discuss their 
demands with the trade union leaders, as they could be considered as being against the 
communist regime and punished. Therefore, empirical evidence demonstrated that the 
Romanian unions were very close to the Soviet type of trade unions, confirming the 
findings of Pravda and Ruble (1986).  
Collective bargaining is generally the most important function of trade unions in Western 
Europe. Evidence in the chemical sector and the four companies examined suggests that 
collective bargaining has become one of their main functions after 1989. A FSLCP union 
official indicated that their main function is to negotiate the collective agreement at 
sectoral level with the employers' association Fepachim. Nevertheless, the sectoral 
agreement is just a minimal framework and it is frequently not implemented. Thus, it is 
unlikely to have an important effect on terms and conditions of employment at company 
level. 
At company level, most respondents consider that the main role of unions is collective 
bargaining and to protect collective rights of their members, as table 8 shows. Less than 
one third of respondents believe that company unions still have a political role, distribute 
welfare benefits or mobilise workers to increase productivity, which were their main 
functions before 1989. Different than expected, findings indicate no significant 
differences between the functions of unions in private firms and in SOEs. Therefore, 
company unions seem to have similar functions to the (sectoral or branch) unions in 
Western Europe, but their effectiveness in representing employees is not necessary alike.  
 
Table 8 - The main functions of trade unions at company level 
Percentage of respondents considering that trade unions perform 
the following functions: 
Company Collec
tive 
bargai
ning  
Monitor 
implement
ation of 
the labour 
legislation 
Protect 
collective 
rights 
Protect 
individu
al rights 
Improve 
working 
conditions 
Mobilise 
members 
to increase 
productivi
ty 
Distribute 
welfare 
benefits 
Provide 
vocation
al 
training 
Political 
role 
S1 80.5 72.4 87.0 57.8 53.7 40.7 45.5 22.0 25.2 
S2 46.7 35.0 39.2 27.5 15.8 24.2 15.9 12.5 10.0 
P1 65.2 55.1 60.6 47.2 38.2 37.1 37.1 12.4 30.3 
P2 65.0 52.0 59.8 41.9 19.7 29.9 29.1 24.8 13.7 
Unweighted 
average 64.4 53.6 61.7 43.6 31.9 33.0 31.9 17.9 19.8 
Independent 
t-test 
Difference between the private 
companies and - SOEs t <1.96;    p>0.05 
  
Survey data presented in table 9 shows that on average, more than 50% of the 
respondents consider that trade union influence on IR increased in the four companies 
investigated. Aro and Repo (1997: 160) found a similar trend in other CEECs. Their 
findings indicate that trade union influence on collective bargaining increased between 
1992 and 1995 in more than 30% of the bargaining units investigated in five CEECs.  
Therefore the study confirms that the influence of the unions over terms and conditions of 
employment increased after 1989, with the adoption of a pluralist approach. 
 
Table 9 - Changes in trade unions influence on terms and conditions of employment 
after 1989 (percentage of respondents) 
Company Increased The same Decreased I do not know 
I did not 
work before 
1989 
S1 81.3 6.5 2.4 0.8 8.9 
S2 35.4 19.8 18.1 9.5 17.2 
P1 56.2 11.2 11.2 4.5 16.9 
P2 50.9 20.2 18.4 2.7 7.9 
Unweighted 
average 56.0 14.4 12.5 4.4 12.7 
Independent  
t-test 
Difference between the private 
companies and - SOEs t =0.103;    p>0.05 
 
Figure 3 indicates that on average, more than 50% of respondents consider that trade 
union have a high influence on specific terms and conditions of employment. Their 
highest impact is on social benefits, followed closely by working conditions and pay. It 
appears that the influence of trade unions on pay increased, but in line with Vickerstaff 
and Thirkell’s (2000) findings, the case studies evidence revealed that despite changes in 
the companies’ environment, both private companies and SOEs still have a social role.  
 
Figure 3.  Percentage of respondents considering that trade unions have a high 
influence on selected terms and conditions of employment 
  
The largest difference in trade union influence on terms and conditions of employment is 
between the two private companies S1 and S2, as figure 3 indicates. Considering that 
company S1 is part of a profitable and growing corporation, while the holding group to 
which company S2 belongs has serious financial difficulties, it appears that the financial 
situation of the company has an important impact on trade union influence. Additionally, 
respondents from company S2 indicated that trade union influence decreased after 1997, 
when the company profits were declining. Thus, evidence does not support the 
expectation that trade union influence would be higher in the SOEs than in the private 
companies. Findings suggest that trade union power is more strongly associated with the 
economic situation of the company than with the ownership. 
Privatization and restructuring have been controversial issues for trade unions after 1989. 
According to a trade union official, the FSLCP supported privatization because there was 
no other alternative to make the companies viable. Respondents revealed that usually, 
unions have negotiated with the expected buyer so-called ‘social conditions’ referring 
primarily to the number of employees which would be made redundant, the severance 
pay and the investment strategy. In three (out of the four) companies investigated, unions 
were consulted before privatization concerning these issues. However, in company P1, 
the state has decided to privatise the maintenance services, covering around 2000 
employees, without consulting the unions. Thus, the participation of unions in the 
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restructuring and privatization depends on the goodwill or the interests of the state 
representatives. 
Frequently trade unions did not fight against the reduction of the personnel, considering 
that it would make companies more profitable in long term. A trade union official said 
“we knew that anyway there would be job losses because there was overmanning, so we 
just tried to make it less painful for employees”. Nevertheless, respondents revealed that 
often restructuring meant nothing other than a reduction of the personnel with neither 
strategy to increase efficiency nor an improvement of the terms and conditions of 
employment for the remaining personnel. In the same vein, the representative of the 
FSLCP said that union support for restructuring was a trap, which led to a huge reduction 
of their members and no benefits. Trade unions’ support for restructuring and 
privatization was widely found in CEECs, as unions considered that it would improve 
terms and conditions of employees and increase the number of jobs later on (Thirkell and 
Vickerstaff, 2002). Nevertheless, the positive results of the reform have been too long in 
coming, particularly in Romania where the gross domestic product only in 2004 achieved 
the level of 1989. 
The transition process represented an opportunity for unions to participate in the 
establishment of new labour legislation as well as in the economic and political strategies. 
As part of the representative confederations, all three union federations from the chemical 
sectors were involved in establishing the labour legislation. Interviewees revealed that the 
government also consulted union federations regarding the national and sectoral medium 
term strategies as well as the harmonization of the legislation concerning the chemical 
sector with the EU requirements. Additionally, a FSLCP official indicated that they lobby 
the government to support the various branches of the chemical sector. Therefore, 
findings confirm that unions have been involved in the transformation process at the 
national level.  
Trade union federations and confederations have strong links with the political parties. 
The two largest union confederations supported the party which won the elections in 
2000, and as result, seven trade union officials were appointed in various Ministries. 
Following the protocols agreed before the elections, a Social Pact was signed in February 
2001, which included the establishment of specific departments for each Ministry 
responsible for the relationship with the social partners. In the chemical sector, there have 
been 12 meetings between the three social partners in the first half of 2001, seeking to 
discuss and solve issues that have occurred in the sector. Therefore, an institutional 
structure for unions’ participation exists, but the quantitative evidence does not indicate 
the quality and the effectiveness of these meetings. 
 
Debatable independence and other internal issues  
A major issue indicated by respondents was the fact that many company trade unions are 
co-opted by the management. The representative of the FSLCP considered that around 
one third of their members are not independent, while the representative of the FSLI 
Petrom considered that half of the workplace unions are subordinated to the management. 
This is substantiated by findings at company level. Interviews and survey data revealed 
that in three (out of the four) companies investigated respondents have doubts about the 
independence of unions from the management. Additionally, interviewees revealed that 
company trade unions have a vertical structure and there is very little communication 
between the trade union officials and members.  
Respondents pointed out the lack of trust among trade union officials at different levels. 
A shop steward said “I always have to go and ask the union leader what is going on in the 
company, but I am not sure that what he tells me is true”. According to a FSLCP 
representative, “it is very difficult to convince union members that what we do is useful”. 
This union official considered that the main internal problem of the FSLCP federation is 
the poor relationship with the company trade unions. The respondent indicated that 
frequently company union leaders communicate distorted information to their members, 
particularly to show that it is due to their merit if something has been achieved. In 
addition, certain company union officials have very close relations to the local council 
officials. As a result, they consider themselves as ‘very important persons’ and they do 
not follow the federation policy. Therefore, empirical findings indicate poor 
communication and a lack of trust between different layers in the trade union hierarchies. 
In the synthesis of employment relations in the CEECs, Pollert (2000: 196) identified as a 
major problem the lack of communication between national trade unions and company 
organization. Thus, the lack of articulation within trade union organizations appears to be 
widespread across CEECs, linked particularly with the structure of the unions. The 
national and the sectoral associations consist of company unions as before 1989, but the 
principle of democratic centralism was removed. As a result, it is very difficult for the 
supra-enterprise level unions to monitor the workplace unions which have control over 
the financial resources and direct relations with the members. 
In order to strengthen the trade union federation, the FSLCP officials consider that they 
should change the structure of the organization. They militate for a federation of 
individual members (as opposed to umbrella organization of the company unions) where 
members would pay their fees directly to the federations. In order to promote their policy 
(which is not sustained by the company unions), since 1999 they started to establish a 
number of local offices which provide assistance and consultation to individual members. 
In this project, a Swiss federation has supported the FSLCP in creating a federation 
similar to those in Western Europe.  
 
4.3 Significance of the findings 
Thirkell and Vickerstaff (2002) identified four stages concerning the trade union role in 
the transformation process in post-communist countries. Examining the role of the 
Romanian unions investigated in the chemical sector from their perspective, a number of 
similarities and differences are observed. Thirkell and Vickerstaff (2002: 57) consider 
that in the first stage, trade unions had a strategic role in the regime change. In contrast to 
Poland and Bulgaria, trade unions in Romania were not involved in the regime change, 
being established after the communist regime collapsed. Thus, they were not strategic 
actors in the regime change, which resulted in a lower degree of involvement in the 
political process, but also a lower legitimacy.  
In the second stage, Thirkell and Vickerstaff (2002: 57) indicated that unions were 
involved in the establishment of the new Labour Codes and they supported the 
restructuring process. In Romania, a new Labour Code was not adopted until 2003, but 
unions had an important role in setting up the labour legislation. As in other CEECs, 
unions generally supported the restructuring process because they believed that it would 
be beneficial in the long term. Additionally, unions were not against the reform to gain 
legitimacy, because they could easily be labelled as ‘Communist’ and enemies of the 
economic progress (Pollert, 2000: 204), particularly in Romania where unions were not 
involved in the downfall of the communist regime.  
According to Thirkell and Vickerstaff (2002), in the third phase tripartite forums were 
developed. In Romania the national tripartite body was established in 1997 and the first 
Social Pact was signed in 2001. Tripartite institutions were developed in Romania latter 
than in other CEECs, mainly because unions did not have a role in the change of the 
communist regime. Additionally, the Romanian governments did not implement drastic 
measures of restructuring until 1997, hence they did not fear social unrest or need unions’ 
support to share the burden for the reform process, such as in Hungary, Poland or 
Bulgaria (Ost, 2000: 8; Vickerstaff and Thirkell, 2000: 246).  
The fourth stage is characterised by a marginalization of the unions by the governments. 
As the economic situation becomes more stable, governments have less fear of social 
unrest, particularly in the context of a decrease of union membership (Thirkell and 
Vickerstaff, 2002). It appears that the Romanian unions just entered in this stage in 2005, 
as the government elected in 2004 aims to reduce the rights of employees in a context of 
economic growth since 2000. Therefore, it appears that the Romanian trade union 
followed the stages identified by Thirkell and Vickerstaff (2002), but there are a number 
of differences as compared to the other CEECs determined particularly by unions’ role in 
the regime change and by the degree of economic transition.  
Changes that have occurred after 1989 led to the termination of the monopoly of the 
official trade union, caused a decentralization of union organizations and generated a 
decline of trade union membership in all CEECs (Pollert, 2000; Thirkell and Vickerstaff, 
2002). Evidence from the chemical sector indicates that the pluralist approach led to the 
emergence of new unions and the increase of autonomy of the company unions. As a 
result, their influence on IR at company level increased after 1989, substantiating the 
expectation that the adoption of a pluralist legislation would lead to an increase of the 
unions influence. 
Case studies indicate that the power of the trade unions is primarily dependent on the 
financial situation of the company. The strongest influence of the trade union was found 
in the most profitable company (S1), while unions had the least influence in company S2, 
which had major financial problems. Evidence suggests that the change of ownership 
does not necessarily determine a modification in the trade union role and influence, as 
data indicates no significant differences between the SOEs and private companies. 
Interviews revealed that the unions of the company S2, which was the first to be 
privatised, are the closest to the communist unions. Respondents indicate that as before 
1989, trade union elections are among the existing officials nominated by themselves 
(‘auto-elections’) and unions do not take into account employees’ demands. Apart from 
the fact that trade union officials are paid by the management, a respondent said that 
“they have bought new houses, very expensive cars and they have remarried young wives 
as top managers did; it’s very difficult to distinguish them from the top management”. 
Thus, despite major changes in companies’ environment after 1989, a number of features 
of the communist unions are still in place and some private employers use very similar 
strategies as before 1989 to weaken the unions. 
Summing up, the key changes in the trade union role and structure concern the 
emergence of a pluralist, more or less, independent trade union organizations with a 
voluntary membership and decentralised organizational structure. After 1989, trade 
unions had a major role in setting up the labour legislation, they had a collective 
bargaining function backed by the right to strike and they generally supported the 
restructuring process. However, trade unions still have many features of the communist 
type, such as being co-opted by the management. Furthermore, trade union federations 
are just a loose umbrella of the company unions, which indicates a weaker development 
of the union federations in CEECs as compared to Western Europe. Trade unions in 
CEECs still have a long way to go to secure a genuine representation of workers’ 
interests.  
 
5 Conclusions 
This paper has examined actual changes in the role of the three main IR actors in 
Romania. The study tested the connection between the adoption of pluralist legislation 
and the influence of the three actors in IR as well as the effect of privatization on the 
three IR actors. A summary of the extent to which evidence substantiates the expectations 
follows: 
• Firstly, it was expected that the adoption of pluralist legislation would lead to a 
decrease of the state intervention in IR, while the influence of the employers and 
trade unions would increase. Findings confirmed that the influence in IR of the 
employers and trade unions has increased since 1989, while the state intervention on 
pay has decreased. Nevertheless, findings suggest that the new roles of the state in the 
transition period resulted in an increase of its overall intervention in IR. Thus, 
evidence confirmed the expectation that the adoption of a pluralist legislation would 
result in a greater role in IR for employers and trade unions, but it shows that the state 
still has strong influence on IR, due to its new roles along with inherited legacies. 
• Secondly, it was expected that changes in the actors’ influence in IR would be deeper 
in the private companies as compared to the SOEs. Comparing findings in the two 
private companies with the two SOEs, overall evidence did not show a clear 
difference between private companies and SOEs. However, considering solely the 
findings in the company S2 privatised six years before the research was conducted (as 
the other private company was privatised for less than a half of year), evidence shows 
that the state intervention in IR is lower than in the two SOEs, the influence of the top 
management is higher and trade unions’ influence is lower. Although overall 
evidence does not substantiate the expectation that there would be deeper changes in 
the private companies as compared to the SOEs, evidence in the company S2 
indicates that in certain cases it is valid, and it may depend on the period since the 
company was privatised. 
By and large, findings confirmed previous studies in CEEC, but the study has brought 
original evidence concerning the development and changes in the role of the IR actors in 
Romania. The main findings that substantiated previous studies are the followings:  
• the state continues to have a high intervention in IR and it has a weak capacity of 
enforcement of the legislation 
• the poor development of employers' associations is associated with a strong influence 
of top managers at the company level 
• trade unions membership has generally declined. Unions are decentralised, 
fragmented and not always independent from the management. However, their 
influence has increased as compared to the pre-1989 era as they started to have a 
(more or less independent) voice, particularly at national and company levels. 
Evidence in Romania revealed also original findings, such as the following: 
• respondents consider that even the state has more freedom to intervene in IR than 
before 1989, due to its major role in the establishment of new legislation, the 
management of the restructuring process and by enforcing (or not) financial discipline 
measures on companies 
• evidence indicates astonishingly little significance, authority and resources given by 
members to a representative employers' association (the Fepachim), as they have only 
a full time official and their headquarters were situated in the same public-owned 
company as trade unions headquarters 
• as regards trade unions, case studies’ findings showed that in the context of major 
reductions of personnel and a poor living standard, union density may increase in 
large companies, where unions have resources to support individual members. 
Among the three IR actors, trade unions are better developed and closer to their 
counterparts operating in continental Western Europe than employers' associations or the 
state. The findings indicate that while the three main actors have started to function 
similarly to their Western European counterparts, there is considerable continuity from 
pre-1989 era, indicating that institutional changes are path dependent. This paper is part 
of the literature that contributes to a deeper understanding of the role of the endogenous 
actors during the transformation from a centrally planned economy towards a market 
based economy.  
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